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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal involves a question of bankruptcy law that 
has important ramifications for a creditor that sells goods to a 
debtor soon before the debtor files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petition. Under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9), a creditor may recover 
as a priority administrative expense the value of goods 
“received by the debtor within 20 days before” the 
bankruptcy petition is filed. In In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 
this Court interpreted a related provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code (11 U.S.C. § 546(c)), and held that “receipt” occurs 
when the buyer takes physical possession of the goods. 740 
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F.2d 220, 224–25 (3d Cir. 1984). Does the word “received” in 
§ 503(b)(9) likewise require physical possession? We hold 
that it does.  
I 
The facts of this appeal are undisputed. Appellants 
Haining Wansheng Sofa Company and Fujian Zhangzhou 
Foreign Trade Company (the Creditors) are Chinese 
companies that sold furniture and similar goods to World 
Imports (the Debtor) in the ordinary course of business. 
Those goods were shipped via common carrier from China to 
the United States “free on board” (FOB) at the port of origin, 
so the risk of loss or damage passed to World Imports upon 
transfer at the port. 
The Haining shipment left Shanghai, China on May 
26, 2013, and World Imports took physical possession of the 
goods in the United States on June 21, 2013. Fujian’s goods 
were shipped on three separate dates from Xiamen, China on 
May 17, May 31, and June 7, 2013, and they were accepted in 
the United States within 20 days of July 3, 2013, the day on 
which World Imports filed its Chapter 11 petition. 
Both Haining and Fujian filed Motions for Allowance 
and Payment of Administrative Expense Claims under 11 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). Such claims are allowed if: “(1) the 
vendor sold ‘goods’ to the debtor; (2) the goods were 
received by the debtor within twenty days [before the 
bankruptcy] filing; and (3) the goods were sold . . . in the 
ordinary course of business.” In re Goody’s Family Clothing, 
Inc., 401 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
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The dispositive question in the Bankruptcy Court was 
whether World Imports “received the goods within 20 days 
prior to the bankruptcy filing.” In re World Imports, Ltd. 
(World Imports I), 511 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014). 
The parties agreed that Appellants shipped the goods from 
China “more than 20 days before the July 3, 2013 bankruptcy 
filing,” and that World Imports “took physical possession of 
the goods in the United States fewer than 20 days before the 
bankruptcy filing.” In re World Imports, Ltd. (World Imports 
II), 549 B.R. 820, 822 (E.D. Pa. 2016). They disagreed, 
however, about which action (shipment or physical 
acceptance) constituted receipt under § 503(b)(9).  
In evaluating the question, the Bankruptcy Court 
began by acknowledging that the operative word “received” 
in § 503(b)(9) is not defined. It then rejected the argument 
advanced by Haining and Fujian that state law (i.e., the 
Uniform Commercial Code) should “provide a rule of 
decision for [the] gap[] in [this] federal statute[].” World 
Imports I, 511 B.R. at 741. Instead, the Bankruptcy Court 
looked to the Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG)—which it found governed disputes 
arising between the Debtor and Creditors—as a treaty that 
preempts the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in this case. 
Like the Bankruptcy Code, the CISG does not define the term 
“received,” so the Court looked to international commercial 
terms (Incoterms), which are incorporated into the CISG. And 
although no Incoterm defines “received,” the incoterm 
governing FOB contracts makes clear that the risk of damage 
or loss transfers to the buyer when the seller delivers the 
goods to the common carrier’s vessel. Id. at 745 (quoting 
FOB Incoterm). Because the risk of loss transferred at the 
port, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the goods were 
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“constructively received” when shipped from China. Id. 
Appellants’ motions were denied accordingly. Id. at 746. 
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court and 
Haining and Fujian filed this appeal. 
II 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), and the District Court had appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). “We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 1291 and 
exercise the same standard of review as the District Court 
when it reviewed the original appeal from the Bankruptcy 
Court.” In re Handel, 570 F.3d 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2009). 
“Thus, we . . . exercise plenary review over the Bankruptcy 
Court’s legal determinations.” Id. 
III 
At issue in this appeal is the definition of the term 
“received” as used in 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). If World Imports 
received the goods when they were loaded onto the common 
carrier in China, then Appellants’ claims for administrative 
priority fail. But if the goods were received only when World 
Imports took physical possession of them, then Appellants’ 
claims are entitled to “the highest priority.” World Imports I, 
511 B.R. at 741. Based on the ordinary meaning of 
“received,” the legislative context of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and persuasive decisions finding that Congress meant to use 
the UCC definitions for this particular amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Code, we hold that goods are “received” when 





 We begin, as we always do, with the text and context 
of the relevant statute: 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). The Bankruptcy 
Code does not define the word “received,” so “we normally 
construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.” 
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). And if the 
operative word “had at the time a well-known meaning at 
common law or in the law of this country, [it is] presumed to 
have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the 
contrary.” Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 
1, 59 (1911). The well-known meaning is especially salient 
for bankruptcy law because the Supreme Court has 
recognized that “[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy 
laws, it does not write ‘on a clean slate.’” Dewsnup v. Timm, 
502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) (citation omitted). 
The most recent edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “receive” as “[t]o take . . . ; to come into possession 
of or get from some outside source.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014). The 1990 edition of Black’s defined 
“receive” as “[t]o take into possession and control; [to] accept 
custody of.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th ed. 1990). 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “receive,” with 
respect to physical goods, as “[t]o take into one’s hands or 
one’s possession (something offered or given by another); to 
take delivery of (something) from another, either for oneself 
or for a third party.” Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009). 
Although these definitions are not identical, they all require 
physical possession. Applying these definitions to 
§ 503(b)(9), a debtor must “take” goods into its “possession,” 
“custody,” or “hands” in order to receive them. 
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The legal and dictionary definitions comport with the 
definition found in the UCC. Section 2–103(1)(c) defines 
“receipt” of goods as “taking physical possession of them.” 
And because Article 2 of the UCC governed sales of goods in 
49 states when 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) was adopted, see 
Goody’s Family Clothing, 401 B.R. at 134, we infer that 
Congress meant to adopt this “well-known meaning” of the 
term, Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59. See In re Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. (Circuit City II), 432 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2010) (finding near-unanimous adoption of the UCC may 
have informed Congress’s intended definition of the term 
“received”). World Imports has “presented [no]thing to 
suggest that Congress meant to deviate from the common and 
well known meaning of the word ‘received’ in drafting 
§ 503(b)(9)” in 2005. Id. In fact, there is ample evidence from 
the statutory context that Congress relied on the UCC 
definition of the word. We turn to that context now.  
2 
Section 503(b)(9) was enacted as part of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
Section 1227 of BAPCPA, entitled “Reclamation,” did two 
things: (1) it amended § 546(c) to clarify the conditions 
placed on trustees and sellers that seek to reclaim goods sold 
to a debtor; and (2) it created § 503(b)(9) to add an 
administrative expense claim as an exemption from § 546(c)’s 
reclamation conditions. See BAPCPA § 1227. 
The interrelationship between § 546(c) and § 503(b)(9) 
is explicit in the Bankruptcy Code. Section 546(c)(2) states: 
“If a seller of goods fails to provide notice . . . the seller still 
may assert the rights contained in section 503(b)(9).” Because 
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§ 503(b)(9) provides “an alternative remedy to reclamation,” 
In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. D.N.H. 
2011), it should be read and interpreted consistent with 
§ 546(c).  
In In re Marin Motor Oil, this Court held that the word 
“receipt” in § 546(c) means the same thing as the UCC’s 
definition, namely, “taking physical possession.” 740 F.2d at 
224–25. In doing so, we found that Congress originally 
adopted § 546(c) in 1978 “in order to resolve the question [of] 
whether U.C.C. § 2–702(2) [(allowing reclamation)] applies 
where the debtor files for bankruptcy.” Id. at 223 (footnote 
omitted). The “drafters of the Bankruptcy Code” basically 
“adopt[ed] 2–702(2) as part of the federal bankruptcy law,” 
but with some procedural modifications. Id. We reasoned that 
because “Congress essentially borrowed [the reclamation 
provision] from the U.C.C.,” it “also borrowed the standard 
definition of receipt.” Id. at 225 n.9. There was no indication 
in Marin that the meaning of “receipt” could change 
depending on the terms of the contract at issue. Rather, we 
held that “receipt,” as used in § 546(c), means “taking 
physical possession”—the UCC definition—as a matter of 
federal law. Id. at 224–25.1 
                                                 
1 There is also a wide consensus among bankruptcy 
courts that because the § 546 right of reclamation “arises 
under § 2–702 of the UCC,” In re Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
(Circuit City I), 416 B.R. 531, 536 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009), 
Congress meant for undefined terms in § 546(c), including 
“receipt,” to take the meaning ascribed to them in the UCC at 
the time § 546 was enacted (“physical possession”). See, e.g., 
Circuit City II, 432 B.R. at 228–29 (citing, e.g., In re Trico 
Steel Co., LLC, 282 B.R. 318, 324 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)); In 
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 “It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction 
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and 
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 
U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). When two terms are “functional[ly] 
equivalent” and used in the same context, they should be 
treated identically. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 481 
(2008). 
The context of § 503(b)(9) is clear: it is an exemption 
to the general bankruptcy reclamation scheme established by 
§ 546(c). See § 546(c)(2). Given the interrelationship between 
these two provisions and our holding that Congress meant for 
terms used in § 546(c) to bear the definition used in the UCC 
at the time of BAPCPA’s enactment, it follows that the UCC 
definitions also apply to the § 503(b)(9) exception.2 It follows 
that since we have already held in Marin that the term 
“receipt” used in § 546(c) means “taking physical 
                                                                                                             
re Bill’s Dollar Stores, Inc., 164 B.R. 471, 474 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 1994). 
 
2 We note as we did in Marin that “[o]ur reliance on 
the [UCC] for determining the time of receipt does not mean 
that the definition of receipt under [the Bankruptcy Code] is a 
matter of state law and might change were an individual state 
to alter its [laws].” 740 F.2d at 225 n.9. Rather, Congress 
intended to use the UCC definition at that time (physical 
possession) and it is not subject to change absent an 




possession,” 740 F.2d at 224–25, “received” means the same 
thing in § 503(b)(9). 
Our conclusion is further supported by Congress’s 
placement of §§ 546(c) and 503(b)(9) (and only those 
sections) under the heading “Reclamation” in Section 1227 of 
BAPCPA. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 
Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (noting importance of subchapter 
location for word’s meaning). World Imports and the lower 
courts have pointed to nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that 
indicates that Congress intended a different definition for 
“received” between these two provisions in the same 
subchapter. On the contrary, the statutory scheme warrants a 
consistent interpretation of terms that appear in both § 546(c) 
and § 503(b)(9), as several courts have already held.3 
Under § 546(c), notice for reclamation must be made 
within 45 days after goods are received, but §503(b)(9) 
provides an exemption for goods received within 20 days 
before bankruptcy. It strikes us as quite implausible that 
Congress meant for the date of receipt to be different between 
these provisions. Indeed, for this general-rule-and-exemption 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Ningbo Chenglu Paper Prods. Mfg. Co. v. 
Momenta, Inc., 2012 WL 3765171, at *6 (D.N.H. Aug. 29, 
2012) (“Sections 503(b)(9) and 546 are related statutory 
provisions [and] . . . the word ‘received’ should be given the 
same meaning in both sections . . . .”); In re Wezbra Dairy, 
LLC, 493 B.R. 768, 770–71 & n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) 
(relying on Marin and applying the UCC definition of 
“receipt” to § 503(b)(9)); Circuit City I, 416 B.R. at 535–37 
(applying UCC definition of “goods” to § 503(b)(9)); 




scheme to make sense, the date of receipt must be fixed. The 
rules point to two time periods defined with respect to a 
fixed-date event: notice within 45 days of, or bankruptcy 
filing within 20 days of, the goods being received. As such, 
consistent with the statutory context and history, 
§ 503(b)(9)—like § 546(c)—finds its definition in the UCC. 
B 
World Imports argues that despite the foregoing 
reasons, the goods in this case were constructively received 
upon delivery because they were delivered “FOB” to a 
common carrier. While it is true that a buyer may be deemed 
to have received goods when his agent takes physical 
possession of them, common carriers are not agents. 
Constructive receipt thus does not include “FOB delivery” to 
a common carrier, as the Bankruptcy Court and District Court 
assumed.  
Delivery, or transfer of title or risk of loss, has been 
treated as distinct from actual receipt of goods by the buyer. 
The official comment to the UCC’s definition of receipt 
makes this distinction: 
“Receipt” must be distinguished from delivery 
particularly in regard to the problems arising 
out of shipment of goods, whether or not the 
contract calls for making delivery by way of 
documents of title, since the seller may 
frequently fulfill his obligations to “deliver” 




UCC § 2-103 cmt. 2 (emphasis added); see also In re Trico 
Steel Co., LLC, 282 B.R. 318, 324 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) 
(describing this comment as “highlight[ing] the distinction 
between ‘delivery’ (when title passes) and ‘receipt’”). A 
seller may deliver goods to a common carrier—thereby 
relinquishing title and risk of loss—some time before the 
goods are received by the buyer or its agent. 
This Court in Marin explicitly stated that delivery and 
receipt of goods can occur at different times. See 740 F.2d at 
225. We found that “the U.C.C. does not rely on the concept 
of ‘title’ for purposes of establishing the rights of buyers and 
sellers under the Code.” Id. After finding that “receipt” in 11 
U.S.C. § 546(c) is defined the same way as in the UCC 
(requiring physical possession), id. at 224–25 & n.9, we noted 
that the UCC “views goods given by a seller to a common 
carrier for delivery to a buyer as being in the possession of 
the common carrier not the buyer,” id. at 225. Under this 
framework, the seller has “the right to stop delivery of the 
goods” while the common carrier remains in possession. Id. 
And “[t]his right to stop delivery applies regardless of which 
party bears the risk of loss, and regardless of which party is 
deemed to have ‘title’ to the goods while they are in the 
carrier’s possession.” Id. Only upon the buyer’s physical 
possession does the seller’s remedy convert to the “different 
right” of reclamation (governed in bankruptcy cases by 
§ 546(c)). Id.  
In other words, regardless of FOB status, under the 
UCC and Chapter 11, receipt does not occur until after the 
seller’s ability to stop delivery ends—namely, upon the 
buyer’s physical possession. See id. The upshot of all this is 
that the transfer of risk is not the same thing as receipt. See, 
e.g., Trico Steel, 282 B.R. at 324 (“Although title may have 
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passed to [the buyer] pursuant to the terms of the contract, 
those terms did not transfer actual physical possession of the 
[goods].”). 
Rather than look to this precedent, the Bankruptcy 
Court and District Court asserted that “goods are perforce 
constructively received” when delivered to the common 
carrier FOB. World Imports I, 511 B.R. at 745; accord World 
Imports II, 549 B.R. at 824. In our view, that assertion 
misapplies the concept of constructive receipt.4 While actual 
                                                 
4 The lower courts looked to the CISG and Incoterms 
because they assumed the lack of definition for “received” in 
the Bankruptcy Code created a gap in the statute that could 
only be filled by reference to other federal law as the “rule of 
decision.” See World Imports I, 511 B.R. at 741; accord 
World Imports II, 549 B.R. at 823. However, the Bankruptcy 
Code itself provides the relevant substantive law in this case, 
and in interpreting Code terms, we do not necessarily assume 
that Congress intended to adopt a definition from another 
source of federal law in the “absence of any explicit 
connector” between the Bankruptcy Code and a definition 
contained in another statute. United States v. Reorganized CF 
& I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1996). 
In addition, while the CISG and the Incoterm definition of 
FOB would certainly be relevant in a contract dispute 
between these parties, the relevant inquiry for this appeal is 
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, not the intent of the 
parties.  See In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 
507, 512 (3d Cir. 2005); see Appellants’ Br. 15. Finally, 
while we sometimes presume that federal statutes are to be 
interpreted consistent with treaties joined by the United 
States, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437–39 
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possession by an agent on behalf of a buyer constitutes 
constructive receipt, our caselaw is clear that common 
carriers do not qualify as agents. When a buyer “arrange[s] 
for a commercial barge operated by a common carrier to pick 
up the” goods from the seller, Marin, 740 F.2d at 222, the 
carrier does not act as an agent for purposes of receipt. See id. 
at 226 & n.13; see also Trico Steel, 282 B.R. at 323 (finding 
that “mere intermediaries in the transport” of goods do not 
qualify as agents). Bankruptcy courts in the Third Circuit 
have recognized this distinction since Marin. See, e.g., Mayer 
Pollock Steel Corp., 157 B.R. 952, 960 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1993) (“It is true that a constructive receipt will satisfy the 
requirements for reclamation if . . . the buyer’s bailee receives 
possession of the goods . . . . However, receipt of the goods 
by a common carrier is not deemed constructive possession 
by a buyer, but rather is deemed to be possession by the 
common carrier.” (citing Marin, 740 F.2d at 225)). Thus, the 
common carrier in this case did not act as an agent for World 
Imports. 
In sum, there is no support for the idea that a buyer 
constructively receives goods when they are delivered to a 
common carrier, even if title and risk of loss pass at that time. 
IV 
 Consistent with this Court’s holding in Marin, we now 
hold that receipt as used in 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) requires 
physical possession by the buyer or his agent. And because 
World Imports took physical possession within the 20-day 
period prior to commencement of its bankruptcy case, we will 
                                                                                                             
(1987), we perceive no potential conflict between our holding 
here and the CISG. See Appellants’ Br. 21–23. 
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reverse the order of the District Court and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
